DEFENDANT(S) NOTICE OF PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM NON-PARTY July 21, 2023 (2024)

Case

RIVERMILL HOLDINGS LLC vs. RIVERMILL HOLDINGS LLC

Jul 16, 2024 |YOUNG, TOM |CIRCUIT CIVIL |BUSINESS TRANSACTION-OTHER CIVIL |2024 CA 001953 OC

Case

J G WENTWORTH ORIGINATIONS LLC vs. UNITED STATES LIFE INS CO IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Jul 19, 2024 |YOUNG, TOM |CIRCUIT CIVIL |BUSINESS TRANSACTION-OTHER CIVIL |2024 CA 001983 OC

Case

GLOBAL ENTERPRISE SOLUTION, LLC vs. GLOBAL ENTERPRISE SOLUTION, LLC

Jul 17, 2024 |YOUNG, TOM |CIRCUIT CIVIL |CONTRACTS |2024 CA 001963 CI

Case

BANKERS HEALTHCARE GROUP LLC vs. PRINCE, KELLY G

Jul 18, 2024 |YOUNG, TOM |CIRCUIT CIVIL |CONTRACTS |2024 CA 001977 CI

Case

MILTON, MAKEVIA vs. MILTON, MAKEVIA

Jul 15, 2024 |YOUNG, TOM |CIRCUIT CIVIL |PREMISES LIABILITY COMMERCIAL-OTHER NEGLIGENCE |2024 CA 001945 ON

Case

J G WENTWORTH ORIGINATIONS LLC vs. J G WENTWORTH ORIGINATIONS LLC

Jul 18, 2024 |ARENDAS, CHRISTINE E |CIRCUIT CIVIL |BUSINESS TRANSACTION-OTHER CIVIL |2024 CA 001976 OC

Case

VAZQUEZ, JORGE vs. VAZQUEZ, JORGE

Jul 17, 2024 |YOUNG, TOM |CIRCUIT CIVIL |CONTRACTS |2024 CA 001965 CI

Case

LI, QINZE vs. MAGIC VILLAGE 3, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Jul 18, 2024 |ARENDAS, CHRISTINE E |CIRCUIT CIVIL |CONTRACTS |2024 CA 001978 CI

Case

CHASE BANK USA, NA. vs. NESTER, LOUIS L

May 14, 2008 |TOM YOUNG |CIRCUIT CIVIL |CONTRACTS |2008 CA 004045 CI

Ruling

LOPEZ vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

Jul 16, 2024 |CVPS2305174

LOPEZ vs AMERICAN HONDA Motion to Compel: Answer/Response toCVPS2305174 MOTOR CO., INC., A Production of Documents by KARLACALIFORNIA CORPORATION LOPEZTentative Ruling: Hearing taken off calendar by moving party. Notice of withdrawal of motion filedJuly 9, 2024.

Ruling

WILSHIRE QUINN INCOME FUND REIT, LLC VS MARINE A. SARKISIAN, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |11/28/2022 |23SMCV02418

Case Number: 23SMCV02418 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Wilshire Quinn Income Fund Reit, LLCs Motion to Compel Defendant Victor Lossis Compliance with the Courts Order, or Alternatively, for Terminating Sanctions, and Request for Sanctions Against Defendant for Failure to Comply with Court Order is DENIED. Plaintiff Wilshire Quinn Income Fund Reit, LLC to give notice. REASONING Plaintiff Wilshire Quinn Income Fund Reit, LLC (Plaintiff) moves the Court for an order compelling Defendant Victor Lossi (Lossi) to comply with the Courts order dated February 29, 2024, which granted Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant Victor Lossis Verified and Objection-Free Responses to Its Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and ordered Lossi to serve responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, without objections, within 30 days of entry of the Courts order, and order Lossi and defense counsel to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,320 to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel within 30 days of entry of the Courts order. In alternative, Plaintiff seeks terminating sanctions against Lossi, striking his answer and entering default judgment against Lossi. Put simply, the Court cannot issue an order compelling a party to compel with a court order, as it has already done so in issuing the prior order in the first place. As to whether terminating sanctions are proper, if a party engages in the misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose sanctions including terminating, evidence, and monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery also constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) The trial court has broad discretion in selecting discovery sanctions, subject to reversal only for abuse. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 (Doppes).) [T]wo facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply and (2) the failure must be willful. (Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Admrs, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, ellipsis omitted.) A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) While Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Courts prior order, the Court finds that terminating sanctions are not warranted at this juncture. Terminating sanctions are a drastic remedy that the Court is not prepared to impose, particularly where Plaintiff moved for terminating sanctions just over a week after responses were due pursuant to the Courts order. The California discovery statutes provide an incremental approach to discovery sanctions (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992), such that it would be improper for the Court to jump from an order entering an order compelling discovery responses to an order for terminating sanctions, as Plaintiff asks the Court to do, because this does not represent the incremental approach contemplated by California law. Put simply, less severe sanctions [may] produce compliance with the discovery rules, and until the Court has imposed incrementally harsher sanctions to curb Plaintiffs failure to provide discovery responses, the Court declines to impose the ultimate sanction of termination. (See Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) The Court will also not impose additional monetary sanctions, as the Court has already awarded sanctions in the prior order, and it is not inclined to double its award based on the same discovery. Accordingly, Plaintiff Wilshire Quinn Income Fund Reit, LLCs Motion to Compel Defendant Victor Lossis Compliance with the Courts Order, or Alternatively, for Terminating Sanctions, and Request for Sanctions Against Defendant for Failure to Comply with Court Order is DENIED.

Ruling

TAWANA JEAN COOPER VS OCTAPHARMA PLASMA, INC., ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |23NWCV01923

Case Number: 23NWCV01923 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Tawana Jean Cooper vs Octapharma Plasma, Inc., et al. Case No.: 23NWCV01923 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 @ 9:30 AM #7 Tentative Ruling Defendants Motion for an Order Declaring Plaintiff to be a Vexatious Litigant is DENIED without prejudice. Clerk to give notice. Background On June 23, 2023, Plaintiff Tawana Jean Cooper, proceeding in propria persona, filed suit against Defendants Octapharma Plasma, Inc. and Caitlin Ryan for employment discrimination, among other causes of action, related to her job as a part-time medical screener. Defendants move this Court for an order declaring Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant and an order that Plaintiff furnish security pursuant CCP § 391. In the alternative, Defendants seek terminating sanctions or a pre-filing order pursuant to CCP § 391.7(a). Request for Judicial Notice Defendants request judicial notice of thirty-four (34) exhibits in this action, including various documents in the court record and documents filed in other court proceedings. The Court may take judicial notice of its own court records and those of any court of this state or of the United States. (Cal. Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).) Accordingly, the Requests for Judicial Notice are GRANTED. Legal Standard As relevant here, a vexatious litigant is a person who does any of the following: (1) In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing& (3) In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. (CCP § 391, subd. (b).) Discussion Plaintiffs Prior Litigation To qualify as a vexatious litigant under CCP § 391, subd. (b)(1), Defendants must demonstrate that Plaintiff commenced, in propria persona, and within the past seven years, at least five litigations (other than in small claims court) that have been finally determined against her, or have been unjustifiably permitted to remain pending for at least two years. Here, Defendants have produced evidence of seven lawsuits involving Plaintiff. However, it appears only two of these actions (the 2018 red-light citation and the 2021 lawsuit against OptumRx) were commenced within seven years of June 23, 2023, when the instant lawsuit was filed. Additionally, the red-light citation was not commenced by Plaintiff and the action filed in 2021 is still on-going. Therefore, neither of these cases qualify as actions commenced by Plaintiff which have been finally determined against her. The Court may not declare Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigate based upon Plaintiffs prior litigation. Litigation in the Current Lawsuit To qualify as a vexatious litigant under CCP § 391, subd. (b)(3), Defendants must demonstrate that Plaintiff repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has filed nine motions to compel discovery responses and each motion heard to date has been denied by the Court. Defendants also point to complaints Plaintiff has made against former defense counsel and this Court. Plaintiff disagrees with how the Court has ruled on her discovery motions. She argues she has a right to preserve the record for appeal. At this juncture, the Court determines there is insufficient evidence that Plaintiff meets the criteria set forth in CCP § 391, subd. (b), to qualify as a vexatious litigant. In her motions to compel discovery, Plaintiff argues that Defendants responses were not properly verified because the oath was on a verification page, not on the response itself. The Code requires a responding party to sign the response under oath. (Code Civ. Proc., §2031.250, subd. (a).) In denying the motions, the Court noted that in practice the responding party may sign a verification form as Defendants did. Although the Court has rejected Plaintiffs argument, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiffs argument is wholly without merit. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a non-frivolous argument may become frivolous by virtue of being repeated. Moreover, the motions to compel discovery are substantially similar to each other, and they have been met with substantially similar oppositions and rulings by the Court. At this time, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has placed an unreasonable burden on the Court or opposing counsel. Accordingly, Defendants motion to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants requests for an order requiring Plaintiff to furnish security and for a pre-filing order prohibiting the filing of new litigation are dependent upon a finding that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. Accordingly, these requests are also DENIED without prejudice. Defendants request for terminating sanctions is DENIED without prejudice for the reasons stated above.

Ruling

MERCY 1031, LLC, ET AL. VS RAINTREE PARTNERS MANAGEMENT LLC, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |11/28/2022 |20SMCV00877

Case Number: 20SMCV00877 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE ORDER Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLCs Motion to Compel Nonparty Alex Arroyos Deposition and Order to Show Cause re: Contempt is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Nonparty Alex Arroyo shall meet and confer with Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLC within ten (10) days of entry of this order for a deposition date to occur within ninety (90) days of entry of this order. Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLCs Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED. Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLCs Motion for an Order to Show Cause re: Contempt is DENIED. Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLC to give notice. REASONING Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLC (Plaintiffs) move the Court for an order compelling nonparty Alex Arroyo to appear for deposition after he failed to appear for his noticed deposition on May 1, 2024. Plaintiffs represent that attempts to contact Arroyo after service of the notice of deposition were unproductive, with Arroyo refusing to commit to making an appearance, and efforts to communicate with Arroyo since May 1, 2024, have gone unanswered. Any party may obtain discovery . . . by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.) Where the witness whose deposition is sought is not a party, a subpoena must be served to compel his or her attendance, testimony, or production of documents. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010, subd. (a).) If a nonparty disobeys a deposition subpoena, the subpoenaing party may seek a court order compelling the nonparty to comply with the subpoena within 60 days after completion of the deposition record. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subds. (a)-(b).) Where the deposition subpoena requires a witness to appear for the taking of a deposition, the Court may make an order directing compliance with the subpoena. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).) The Court finds there is good cause to order Arroyos deposition. Although they fail to provide a sworn statement to this effect, Plaintiffs represent in their motion papers that Arroyo was, during part of the time period relevant to this action, an employee of property management firm Avenue5 that managed and performed routine maintenance work on the property at issue in this action. (Mot., p. 4, ll. 8-10.) Arroyo was properly served a deposition subpoena and failed to appear, such that the deposition record was closed on May 1, 2024 (Mot., Dance Decl. ¶ 6), Plaintiffs moved to compel Arroyos deposition within less than 60 days, and subsequent meet-and-confer efforts have been unsuccessful (Mot., Dance Decl. ¶ 7). The Court has reason to conclude that Arroyo may have knowledge relevant to the subject matter involved in this action, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to take his deposition. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLCs Motion to Compel Nonparty Alex Arroyos Deposition is GRANTED. Nonparty Alex Arroyo shall meet and confer with Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLC within ten (10) days of entry of this order for a deposition date to occur within ninety (90) days of entry of this order. If a motion to compel a nonparty deposition is granted, [t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).) Arroyo has not opposed the present motion; thus, an award of monetary sanctions is proper, and Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLCs Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED. As to Plaintiffs request for an order finding Arroyo to be in contempt of court, Code of Civil Procedure section 1209, subdivision (a), sets forth twelve grounds upon which the Court may find that conduct to constitute contempt of court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, subd. (a)(5).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1211, subdivision (a), provides that [w]hen the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or of the judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators, or other judicial officers. If the judicial officer finds that the affidavit provided by the moving party charges facts sufficient to constitute contempt, an order to show cause may be issued. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1212; In re Koehler (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169.) The punishment for contempt is up to five days imprisonment, a fine of up to $1,000 for each contempt, or both. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1218, subd. (a).) The Court is not inclined to issue an order to show cause re: contempt here, as it is not clear to the Court that Arroyo is familiar with the justice system or is represented, i.e., guidance by the process server and Plaintiffs counsel to attend a deposition are not the same as a court order requiring an individual to do so. The Court trusts that Arroyo will comply with the present order, and if he has no knowledge relevant to the subject matter at issue in this case, this can be determined during his deposition. Thus, Plaintiffs Mercy 1031, LLC and Loyal 1031, LLCs Motion for an Order to Show Cause re: Contempt is DENIED.

Ruling

KPG HEALTHCARE LLC, AN ARIZONA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS SAVANT CARE INC., A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |23STCV29725

Case Number: 23STCV29725 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT KPG HEALTHCARE LLC, Plaintiff, vs. SAVANT CARE INC., et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV29725 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 18, 2024 Tara Aleagha, counsel of record for Defendant Mindful Values, seeks to be relieved as counsel. Counsels declaration states that Defendant has decided to cease operations and dissolve the business. Defendants director informed counsel that they do not want to retain counsel, making it impractical and burdensome for counsel to continue the representation. No party opposed the motion. Absent a showing of resulting prejudice, an attorneys request for withdrawal should be granted. (People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398, 406.) Counsels motion generally complies with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362. Trial is not until March 10, 2025, and there is no prejudice to Defendant. Neither the declaration nor the proposed order includes all future hearings dates. The proposed order also does not include Defendants current or last known address and telephone number. Counsel must submit a revised and complete proposed order before the hearing, or the Court will deny the motion without prejudice. Subject to the submission of a revised and complete proposed order, the unopposed motion to be relieved is GRANTED and effective upon filing a proof of service showing service of the signed Form MC-053 orders and this order on Mindful Values and all parties who have appeared. However, a corporation cannot represent itself in a court of record either in propria persona or through an officer or agent who is not an attorney. (Caressa Camille, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.) Therefore, an Order to Show Cause Re: Failure to Retain New Counsel for Mindful Values is scheduled for October 18, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 48 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Long Spring Freight LLC must retain new counsel by that date or the Court will strike its answer and place it in default. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 18th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

THE REAL A-TEAM CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION VS INDEPENDENCE HCM INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION;, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |23SMCV03909

Case Number: 23SMCV03909 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 205 DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROVE-UP CHECKLIST (CRC Rule 3.1800) Case Name: The Real A-Team Corporation v. Independence HCM Inc., et al Case #: 23SMCV03909 Hearing Date (if any): July 16, 2024 Defaulting Party: Defendants Independence HCM Inc. and Dov Jacobs. Total Amount: $211,745.35 BACKGROUND: On August 21, 2023, Plaintiff The Real A-Team Corporation filed a complaint against Defendants Independence HCM Inc. and Dov Jacobs. Plaintiff, a consulting firm, helps home health companies with placement, compliance, billing, and recertification for Medicare and Medi-Cal. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Defendants provide in-home care billed to Medicare or other insurance. (Compl. ¶ 8.) From May 2017 to August 2018, Plaintiff entered into four service agreements with Legacy and Defendants, who claimed to be the same organization. Plaintiff performed its obligations, but Defendants did not pay in full. (Compl. ¶ 9-10.) Defendants assured Plaintiff they would pay for all services and managed Legacys accounts, making some payments to Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 11.) However, several checks from Defendants bounced due to insufficient funds. (Compl. ¶ 12.) On September 5, 2019, a $30,000 check from Defendants was returned, causing Plaintiff to incur a bank fee. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff continued to provide services and follow up on payments but suspended services on September 12, 2019, due to non-payment. (Compl. ¶ 14-15.) Plaintiff filed for arbitration with JAMS against Legacy and Defendants Jacobs and Independence. The arbitration, held in Los Angeles with Hon. Linda L. Miller, Ret. as arbitrator, resulted in an award of $192,424.21 in favor of Plaintiff on December 21, 2020. (Compl. ¶ 16-19.) Plaintiff filed a Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in the Superior Court of California on June 30, 2021. (Compl. ¶ 20.) On October 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award, which the Court granted on June 8, 2023, confirming the award against Legacy. (Compl. ¶ 21.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jacobs, owner of both Legacy and Independence, disregarded corporate formalities, representing the entities as one and liable for Legacys debts. (Compl. ¶ 2.2) Independences employees worked for Legacy, and Defendants managed Legacys accounts, commingling funds and using business funds for personal expenses. (Compl. ¶ 23-24.) Defendants engaged in fraudulent activities to avoid their obligations, misrepresenting their authority and responsibilities, leading Plaintiff to believe they were liable for services rendered. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Defendants benefited from Plaintiffs services and actively participated in related actions. (Compl. ¶ 26.) [¿] DEFAULT ENTERED ON: [¿] MANDATORY JUDICIAL COUNCIL FORM CIV-100 SUBMITTED FOR ENTRY OF COURT JUDGMENT (CRC 3.1800(a)) [¿] SERVICE: Summons and Complaint · On October 3, 2023, Defendant Dov Jacobs was served via substitute service on Valerie Hanson, Social Service Director at 11620 W. Washington Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90006 · On October 3, 2023, Defendant Independence HCM Inc. was served via substitute service on Valerie Hanson, Social Service Director at 11620 W. Washington Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90006 o Compliant service on a corporation under CCP §§ 416.10, 415.20 [¿] DECLARATION OF MAILING -- Request for Entry of Default to Defendant (CCP § 587) · Mailed to Defendants at 11620 W. Washington Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90006 [¿] NO PENDING MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT [¿] SUMMARY OF CASE PROVIDED (CRC 3.1800(a)(1)) - or other declaration OK [ ] [¿] EVIDENTIARY DECLARATIONS/OTHER EVIDENCE (CRC 3.1800(a)(2)) · Declaration of Michelle Imhotep: o CEO of the Real A-Team Corporation o Imhotep discusses: § The nature of Plaintiffs consulting business and the services provided. § The business operations of Defendants and Legacy Plus Unlimited in providing in-home care services. § Details of the service agreements between Plaintiff, Legacy, and Defendants from May 2017 to August 2018. § Plaintiffs fulfillment of its obligations and Defendants failure to pay in full. § The arbitration process initiated by Plaintiff with JAMS, resulting in a $192,424.21 award in favor of Plaintiff. § Defendant Jacobs misrepresentation and fraudulent activities, including the disregard of corporate formalities and commingling of funds. § The assertion that Jacobs and Independence are alter egos of Legacy, leading to Plaintiff's claims of liability for the services rendered. · Declaration of Navneet Chugh: o Attorney for Plaintiff o Chugh discusses: § The service of summons and complaint to Defendants through their agent for service of process on or about October 3, 2023. § Defendants failure to respond to the Complaint or file any responsive pleadings, leading to a request for entry of default, which was granted on May 23, 2024. § The service agreements entered into by Plaintiff with Legacy Plus Unlimited d/b/a Alta Vista Health Services and Defendants from May 2017 to August 2018, where Plaintiff provided various services but was not paid in full. § Plaintiffs filing of a Demand for Arbitration with JAMS and an Amended Demand against Legacy and Defendants Jacobs and Independence, which led to arbitration proceedings in Los Angeles under Hon. Linda L. Miller, Ret. § Defendant Jacobs active participation in the arbitration proceedings, claiming ownership and authority over Legacy and Independence. § The Arbitrators award in favor of Plaintiff for $192,424.21 against Legacy on December 21, 2020. § Plaintif's filing of a Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in the Superior Court of California on June 30, 2021, and the subsequent Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award on October 13, 2022. § The Courts granting of Plaintiffs Motion on June 8, 2023, confirming the Arbitration Award of $192,424.21 against Legacy. [¿] RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN COMPLAINT (same as requested in default?): [X] yes [ ] no [¿] Compensatory: $ 192,424.21 [] Damages Special: $ General: $ [] Interest: $ [] Costs: $ [¿] Attorney Fees: $ 19,321.14 Total: $ 211,745.35 (Relief afforded in default judgment is limited to type and amount of claims in complaint, except for punitives and PI/death. CCP §§ 425.11, 580, 585(a)(b). The amount in the complaint prayer controls (National Diversified Services, Inc. v. Bernstein (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 410, 418).) Civil Code § 1719(a)(2) states: Notwithstanding any penal sanctions that may apply, any person who passes a check on insufficient funds shall be liable to the payee for damages equal to treble the amount of the check if a written demand for payment is mailed by certified mail to the person who had passed a check on insufficient funds and the written demand informs this person of (A) the provisions of this section, (B) the amount of the check, and (C) the amount of the service charge payable to the payee. The person who had passed a check on insufficient funds shall have 30 days from the date the written demand was mailed to pay the amount of the check, the amount of the service charge payable to the payee, and the costs to mail the written demand for payment. If this person fails to pay in full the amount of the check, the service charge payable to the payee, and the costs to mail the written demand within this period, this person shall then be liable instead for the amount of the check, minus any partial payments made toward the amount of the check or the service charge within 30 days of the written demand, and damages equal to treble that amount, which shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500). When a person becomes liable for treble damages for a check that is the subject of a written demand, that person shall no longer be liable for any service charge for that check and any costs to mail the written demand. [N/A] INTEREST COMPUTATIONS (CRC 3.1800(a)(3)) [ ] ATTORNEY FEE DECLARATION -- Request according to Local Rule 3.214 or reason provided why greater fees should be allowed (CRC 3.1800(b)) [ ] Request for atty fees allowed by statute or agreement of parties (CRC 3.1800(a)(9)): [] $960/$1,200 for book account claim (Civil Code § 1717.5) No attorney fee declaration supporting the requested fees. Plaintiff includes attorneys fees within costs, but in the judgment to be entered puts the costs amounts in the attorneys fees section Civil Code § 1717.5 states: (a) Except as otherwise provided by law or where waived by the parties to an agreement, in any action on a contract based on a book account, as defined in Section 337a of the Code of Civil Procedure , entered into on or after January 1, 1987, which does not provide for attorney's fees and costs, as provided in Section 1717 , the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, as provided below, in addition to other costs. The prevailing party on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section. Reasonable attorney's fees awarded pursuant to this section for the prevailing party bringing the action on the book account shall be fixed by the court in an amount that shall not exceed the lesser of: ¿(1) nine hundred sixty dollars ($960) for book accounts based upon an obligation owing by a natural person for goods, moneys, or services which were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; and one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200) for all other book accounts to which this section applies; or (2) 25 percent of the principal obligation owing under the contract. [¿] MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (CRC 3.1800(a)(4)) [N/A] STATEMENT OF DAMAGES (CCP § 425.11): [ ] PI/Death Case [ ] Punitives demanded [ ] Accounting [ ] Evidence of net worth of defendant? [ ] Yes [ ] No (If no, punitives may not be assessed. Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105.) [¿] DECLARATION OF NON-MILITARY STATUS executed within 6 months? (CRC 3.1800(a)(5); Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1447.) [] REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL OF DOES (CRC 3.1800(a)(7)) [ ] If not, authority/basis for several judgment (CCP § 579) No request for dismissal. [N/A] WAS DEFAULTING DEFENDANT A DOE? (CCP § 474) - must do one of the following: [ ] Summons notifies defendant that s/he was served under a fictitious name [ ] Proof of service states that the Doe amendment form was served with the complaint [ ] Complaint amended to reflect the true defendants name & allegations support claim [¿] ORIGINALS Promissory note or other written obligation to pay money must be provided for cancellation by the Clerk per CRC 3.1806 [ ] If no originals, declaration explaining loss/destruction/unavailability of originals [ ] Proposed order for Court to accept authenticated copy in lieu of original Copies attached to complaint, but no request to accept authenticated copy in lieu of original. [] PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT INCLUDED (CRC 3.1800(a)(6)) No proposed judgment on file. NOTES: 1. Judgment to be entered against only one defendant? CCP §§ 579, 585(a) indicate that judgment may be taken against one defendant in cases having more than one defendant unless liability is joint only (e.g., possession of property). 2. In actions affecting title to or possession of land, Court policy is that oral testimony is required. (CCP § 585(c).) RECOMMENDATION: CONTINUE to allow Plaintiff to cure deficiencies: 1. Dismissal of Doe Defendants 2. Proposed order for Court to accept authenticated copy in lieu of original 3. Proposed judgment 4. File request for entry of court judgment 5. Attorney fee declaration TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs Request for Default Judgment against Defendants is denied without prejudice. The Order to Show Cause re Default Judgment is continued to September 18, 2024 at 9:00 a.m.

Ruling

Jul 15, 2024 |22STCV13109

Case Number: 22STCV13109 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 37 HEARING DATE: Monday, July 15, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 22STCV13109 CASE NAME: Johnstone Supply v. Cubic Air Conditioning, Electric & Solar, Inc. MOVING PARTY: Defendants Cubic Air Conditioning, Electric & Solar, Inc. and Albert Macias OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Johnstone Supply TRIAL DATE: Post Judgment PROOF OF SERVICE: OK PROCEEDING: Motion to File Satisfaction of Judgment and Tax Costs OPPOSITION: 14 June 2024 REPLY: 18 June 2024 TENTATIVE: Defendants motion to file satisfaction of judgment and tax costs is denied. Plaintiff is awarded $11,025 in costs, plus $2,625 in attorneys fees. Defendants to give notice. Background This action arises in connection with a contract between Johnstone Supply (Plaintiff) and Cubic Air Conditioning, Electric & Solar, Inc. (Cubic). Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Albert Macias (Macias), and Cubic are alter egos and/or successors of one another, and asks this court to pierce the corporate veil. Plaintiff alleges that, on or about February 17, 2020, Defendants breached their contract by failing to pay $124,273.73 of the total invoice for goods provided. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges two causes of action: (1) breach of contract and (2) common counts. On June 13, 2022, the court entered a default against Defendants. On August 31, 2022, the court granted default judgment against Defendants. On February 24, 2023, the court granted Defendants motion to vacate the default but only as to Defendant Macias. On August 11, 2023, the court entered judgment pursuant to a stipulation in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants jointly and severally. On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs after judgment in the sum of $18,530.00. On Aril 25, 2024, Defendants moved to tax costs and for an order requiring the Plaintiff (the Judgment Creditor) to file a satisfaction of judgment of the case pursuant to CCP § 725.050(d). motion to file satisfaction of judgment and tax costs I. Legal Standard CCP § 724.010 states: (a) A money judgment may be satisfied by payment of the full amount required to satisfy the judgment or by acceptance by the judgment creditor of a lesser sum in full satisfaction of the judgment. (b) Where a money judgment is satisfied by levy, the obligation of the judgment creditor to give or file an acknowledgment of satisfaction arises only when the judgment creditor has received the full amount required to satisfy the judgment from the levying officer. (c) Where a money judgment is satisfied by payment to the judgment creditor by check or other form of noncash payment that is to be honored upon presentation by the judgment creditor for payment, the obligation of the judgment creditor to give or file an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment arises only when the check or other form of noncash payment has actually been honored upon presentation for payment. CCP § 724.050(a) states: (a) If a money judgment has been satisfied, the judgment debtor, the owner of real or personal property subject to a judgment lien created under the judgment, or a person having a security interest in or a lien on personal property subject to a judgment lien created under the judgment may serve personally or by mail on the judgment creditor a demand in writing that the judgment creditor do one or both of the following: (1) File an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment with the court. (2) Execute, acknowledge, and deliver an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment to the person who made the demand. In an action or proceeding maintained pursuant to this chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party. (CCP § 724.080.) CCP § 1033.5 sets forth the costs recoverable by the prevailing party. To recover a cost, it must be reasonably necessary to the litigation and reasonable in amount. (Perkos Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (l992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244.) If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-74.) On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Id.)¿¿ II. Evidentiary Objections Plaintiffs objections Nos. 1 to 3 are overruled. III. Discussion Defendants as the judgment debtors assert that since January 2024 it has tried to obtain information about the full judgment owned. (Campbell Decl. ¶ 4-7.) On April 18, 2024, Defendants went to the Los Angeles Sheriffs office to ascertain the payoff amount and paid $58,929.00 in satisfaction of the Judgment on April 19, 2024. (Campbell Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9, Ex. 4; Macias Decl. ¶ 2.) On April 22, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel via email that the judgment had not been satisfied in full and that $18,530 was still due. (Campbell Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendants responded by asserting that the $18,530 memorandum of costs was defective because it was filed after the judgment and a demand to file a satisfaction of judgment had been made. (Id. ¶ 12, Ex. 6.) Plaintiff refused. Defendants request that the entire memorandum of costs after judgment be stricken and pursuant to CCP § 724.080, Plaintiff be ordered to pay Defendants reasonable attorneys fees and $100 to Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that including the interest, Defendants paid $58,929.00 but that $58,973.80 was owed, therefore Defendants were short $44.80, and the payment has not been fully satisfied. (Opposition, at p. 3:1-23.) The court notes that the return of attachment/execution by the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department reflects that Defendants have paid in full and money is owed. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants intended to pay off the debt to cut-off Plaintiffs right to seek attorneys fees and costs. (Opposition, at p. 4:16-18.) Most importantly, Plaintiff asserts that the memorandum of costs after judgment is timely because Plaintiff has not yet been paid as the Los Angeles Sheriffs department has not yet disbursed the funds. (Biggins Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.) A judgment is not satisfied for purposes of postjudgment motions until the judgment creditor has been paid. (Wertheim, LLC v. Currency Corp. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1134.) Like Gray1, if they have not yet filed a motion for postjudgment costs at the time the judgment debtor tenders a cashier's check in full payment of the outstanding judgment, they are free to reject the payment and to file a motion for postjudgment costs. (Gray1 CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 896.) Accordingly, because Plaintiff maintains it has not yet been paid by the Sheriffs department, it has the right to reject Defendants tender of payment and seek post-judgment costs. The court finds that pursuant to Gray1 CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015), Plaintiff may reject Defendants tender of payment and file a postjudgment memorandum of costs, as Plaintiff has done here. Accordingly, the memorandum of costs is timely and should not be stricken. The court further finds that Lines 1 to 5 seeking costs totaling $2,780 are allowable costs and necessary to the litigation and supported by the evidence. (Biggins Decl. ¶¶ 9-12, Ex. A, D.) A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of the propriety of the items listed on it, and the burden is on the party challenging these costs to demonstrate that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Bender v. County of Los Angeles¿(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 989.) Accordingly, no costs will be taxed. A. No Accrued Interest However, Plaintiff is not entitled to additional interest on the judgment because Plaintiffs made full payment to the levying officer, the Sheriffs department. (See CCP § 685.030[1].) Section 685.030 enables a judgment debtor to limit its liability for postjudgment interest by tendering satisfaction of the judgment, whether or not the creditor chooses to accept the tender. (Wertheim, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 1134.) The Legislature has declared interest on a judgment ceases to accumulate on the date a check in the amount of the judgment and accumulated interest is delivered to the judgment creditor, notwithstanding the fact that the honoring of the check may take a period of days. (§ 685.030, subd. (d)(2).) (Gray1 CPB, LLC, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 896.) Accordingly, no additional interest accrues on the judgment but Defendants are still liable for postjudgment costs. B. Plaintiffs Right to Postjudgment Attorneys Fees Plaintiff asserts it is entitled to attorneys fees because the judgment expressly awarded attorneys fees. Attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney's fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5. (Rosen v. LegacyQuest (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 375, 381 citing CCP § 685.040.) The court notes that CCP § 1033.5(a)(10)(A) only permits attorneys fees when authorized by contract. Although Exhibit A of the Complaint includes a series of invoices, the court found no express provision permitting attorneys fees. Yet when the parties entered a stipulated judgment, attorneys fees in the amount of $3,300 were awarded. Moreover, Defendants do not deny that the contract and the judgment permitted plaintiffs to recover attorneys fees as the prevailing party. Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees incurred in trying to collect on the judgment. a. Reasonably Hourly Rates Plaintiffs counsel and Defense counsel both have an hourly rate of $750 per hour. (Biggins Decl. ¶ 7; Campell Decl., ¶ 14.) Based upon the skill required in this case and what the Court has observed, the Court finds $750/hour excessive and reduces the hourly rate to $450/hour. b. Reasonable Time Spent Plaintiffs counsel provides an invoice showing fees incurred for time spent communicating with the Defendants who were trying to negotiate payment of a lower amount than what they previously agreed to. (Biggins Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. E.) The invoice shows entries for time spent researching tax liens. (Id.) Accordingly, the 21 hours spent after the judgment was entered, from August 12, 2023, to March 19, 2024, trying to enforce the judgment was reasonably spent. Had Defendants paid the judgment sooner rather than try to negotiate a lesser amount, Plaintiffs counsel would have incurred fewer fees. Therefore, no deductions will be made to time spent and the Court awards $9,450.00 in attorneys fees sought as costs. Plaintiffs counsel additionally requests $7,500 in attorneys fees for opposing this Motion, for 10 hours of work billed at a rate of $750 per hour. (Biggins Decl. ¶ 6.) The court finds that 10 hours spent on this motion is excessive and finds that opposing Defendants motion and preparing for the hearing should have taken about 3.5 hours or $1,575. The court finds that Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to $11,025 in costs plus $2,625 in attorneys fees for costs incurred in trying to enforce the judgment. Only after payment of the above costs will the court enter an order for satisfaction of the judgment. Moreover, Defendants request for attorneys fees is denied. Conclusion Defendants motion to file satisfaction of judgment and tax costs is denied. Plaintiff is awarded $11,025 in costs, plus $2,625 in attorneys fees. Defendants to give notice. [1] CCP § 685.030 states: (a) If a money judgment is satisfied in full pursuant to a writ under this title, interest ceases to accrue on the judgment: (1) If the proceeds of collection are paid in a lump sum, on the date of levy. (2) If the money judgment is satisfied pursuant to an earnings withholding order, on the date and in the manner provided in Section 706.024 or Section 706.028. (3) In any other case, on the date the proceeds of sale or collection are actually received by the levying officer. (b) If a money judgment is satisfied in full other than pursuant to a writ under this title, interest ceases to accrue on the date the judgment is satisfied in full.

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